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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper has three interconnected aims:  proposing a novel and rigorous definition of 
a global value chain (GVC) that more easily permits the delineation of its frontiers; 
creating new indicators of GVC participation and value capture that can overcome the 
limitations of the existing ones; and offering empirical evidence demonstrating that 
participation in global value chains is part of an uneven development process that 
produces a variety of distinct integration patterns that differ with respect to economic 
and social outcomes. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 offers a definition of GVCs that conceives 
the latter as a specific form of the division of labor and therefore facilitates the 
delineation of the frontiers of a GVC. Building on this definition, Section 2 proposes new 
indicators to measure GVC participation and value capture. Section 3 provides empirical 
evidence to argue that, contrary to what mainstream economics and international 
organizations state, larger participation in GVCs does not necessarily lead to higher 
levels of value capture. Section 4 offers some theoretical justifications to interpret these 
findings and adds other measures such as the level of productive investment and 
dimensions of social outcomes in order to better understand differentiated development 
patterns in GVCs. Sections 5, 6 and 7 empirically show the heterogeneity of development 
patterns in GVCs for 51 countries between 1995 and 2008. Using country-level data on 
GVC participation, value capture, investment rates and social indicators (Gini coefficient, 
labor’s share of income, median income and employment rate), we perform a principal 
component analysis and a cluster analysis. We find three distinct development patterns 
in GVCs: reproduction of the core, immiserizing growth, and a social upgrading mirage. 
We conclude by underlying the apparent complementarity between these development 
patterns and by identifying some limitations of the paper that open the way to further 
research. 
 RÉSUMÉ 
 
Cet article a trois objectif interconnectés : proposer une définition originale et 
rigoureuse d’une chaîne globale de valeur (CGV) qui permette de délimiter ses frontières 
plus facilement ; créer de nouveaux indicateurs de participation aux CGV et de capture 
de valeur qui puissent surmonter les limites de ceux qui existent actuellement ; et offrir 
des preuves empiriques qui montrent que la participation aux chaînes globales de valeur 
est un processus qui produit une variété de formes d’intégration qui différent en termes 
de résultats économiques et sociaux. 
 
L’article est organisé comme suit. La Section I offre une définition des CGV qui les 
conçoit comme une forme spécifique de la division du travail et facilite ainsi la 
démarcation des frontières d’une CGV. En s’appuyant sur cette définition, la Section II 
propose de nouveaux indicateurs pour mesurer la participation aux CGV et la capture de 
valeur. La Section 3 apporte des preuves empiriques pour argumenter que, 
contrairement à ce que l’économie orthodoxe et les organisations internationales 
soutiennent, une plus grande participation aux CGV ne conduit pas nécessairement à des 
niveaux de capture de valeur plus élevés. La Section 4 offre quelques justifications 
théoriques pour interpréter ces résultats et ajoute d’autres mesures telles que le niveau 
d’investissement productif et des indicateurs sociaux dans l’objectif de mieux 
comprendre les modèles de développement différentiés dans les CGV. Les Sections 5, 6 
et 7 montrent empiriquement l’hétérogénéité des modèles de développement dans les 
CGV pour 51 pays entre 1995 et 2008. En utilisant des données de niveau national sur la 
participation aux CGV, la capture de valeur, le taux d’investissement et des indicateurs 
sociaux (coefficient de Gini, part des salaires dans le revenu, revenu médian et taux 
d’activité) nous réalisons une analyse en composantes principales et une analyse de 
cluster. Nous trouvons trois modèles de développement différentiés dans les CGV : 
reproduction du noyau, croissance appauvrissante et mirage de progrès social. Nous 
concluons en soulignant l’apparente complémentarité entre ces modèles de 
développement et en identifiant quelques limites de l’article qui ouvrent la voie à de la 
recherche future. 
  
 Introduction 
 
Two different groups are currently using the Global Value Chains (GVC) framework. On 
the one hand, policy institutions provide the standard measurements of GVC 
involvement and realize cross-country analysis to formulate policy recommendations. 
On the other hand, scholars from various disciplines elaborate on GVCs and GVC-related 
concepts (Antràs, 2014; Milberg and Winkler, 2013; Ponte and Sturgeon, 2014; Yeung 
and Coe, 2015a). Unfortunately, the former group (policy institutions) is often 
conducting its measurements with at best a rough and imprecise link to the recent 
achievements of academic theorists. As stated by Gereffi, “much of the literature that 
uses the GVC moniker misses the point and doesn’t apply the framework consistently” 
(Gereffi, 2014, p. 27). Meanwhile most of the academic scholars have not yet managed to 
address the theoretical challenges associated with new empirical discussions and policy 
debates. Since critical views on GVCs are usually made by theorists, there is a need to 
forge concepts that could be mobilized in order to provide empirical support to critical 
approaches to GVCs. 
 
This contribution proposes to overcome this disjuncture between theory, on the one 
side, and macro, multi-country measurements, on the other. It offers some original 
findings concerning the relation between countries’ GVC participation and economic and 
social upgrading.  
 
The second section addresses the limitations of GVC theorization and measurement and 
proposes to conceptualize GVCs as a specific form of the division of labor, distinct from 
both a market-led social division of labor and the internal organization of labor inside of 
firms. One achievement of this definition is to allow for a precise delimitation of the 
frontiers of GVCs and, accordingly, to propose more appropriate measures of GVC 
participation and value capture than currently employed (section 3), along with 
presenting some stylized facts based on these measures, which do not support the 
narrative of international institutions concerning GVC participation and economic 
upgrading (section 4).  We then draw on various strands of literature to delineate 3 
country development patterns depending on the modalities and intensity of GVC 
participation and independently of the products traded (section 5). Relying on trade 
data and standard indicators of economic and social upgrading (investment rates, value 
capture, median income, labor share, Gini index, employment rate) from the OECD, the 
IMF, the Luxembourg Income Study, UNCTADstat, the World Bank and supplemental 
sources, we realize a principal component analysis for 51 countries between 1995 and 
2008 (section 6). Our results discussed in section 7 challenge the dominant narrative of 
a clear positive relation between GVC participation and social and economic upgrading, 
and instead describe a much more nuanced and contrasted relationship that reflects the 
unevenness of development patterns along GVCs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. Conceptualizing GVCs, again 
 
1.1. The policy-theory mismatch in the GVCs literature 
 
Over the past few years, research inspired by the value chains literature attained a new 
dimension. While it used to be limited to an accumulation of case studies, with some 
biases toward success stories (Bair, 2009), more recently a growing strand of research 
mobilized this framework to build cross-country analyses at the macro or industry level 
(De Backer and Miroudot, 2014, pp. 11–16; Durand and Miroudot, 2015; Gangnes et al., 
2015, p. 115; OECD, 2013, p. 12; UNCTAD, 2013, pp. 135–136). This represents a 
significant improvement in the way knowledge on GVCs could inform policies, as such 
international studies are better able to capture development patterns at the macro level 
as well as avoid potential fallacy of composition problems – referring to situations 
where each successful micro case renders the prospect of generalized success less 
possible – that have been found in non-GVC analyses of export-led growth strategies 
(Razmi and Blecker, 2008). 
 
Unfortunately, standard measurement of GVC participation poorly reflects the 
conceptual elaboration of GVCs theorists (Antràs, 2014; Milberg and Winkler, 2013; 
Ponte and Sturgeon, 2014; Yeung and Coe, 2015a). For example, one of the most 
comprehensive reviews of the approaches of seven United Nations agencies to value 
chain development concludes that there is considerable “fuzziness” about how the 
concept is adopted: “…[value chain]-related activities sometimes seem to be rather the 
outcome of ‘re-labelling’ former private sector development interventions. In other 
cases, activities that could clearly be subsumed under the value chain approach are not 
labeled accordingly….These observed shortcomings in knowledge management, 
transparency and the lack of defined unique selling positions make inter-agency 
cooperation in [value chain] promotion difficult” (Stamm and von Drachenfels, 2011, p. 
30). As stated by one of the most prominent figures in the GVC research domain, “much 
of the literature that uses the GVC moniker misses the point and doesn’t apply the 
framework consistently.” (Gereffi, 2014, p. 27). 
 
To be fair, this difficulty in policy-related research reflects, in part at least, a lack of 
theoretical articulation of the GVCs framework, as noticed by numerous authors in the 
field. Most existing conceptual approaches are not explanatory and causal enough to 
provide a coherent theory (Yeung and Coe, 2015b). Global Commodity Chains (GCCs), 
Global Value Chains (GVCs), Global Production Networks (GPNs), Trade in Tasks, etc. – 
the instability of the denomination is symptomatic of a lack of clarity1. Even more 
confusing, some terminological opposition is misleading. For example, the distinctions 
between the GVC and GPN theoretical frameworks are overdrawn and their implications 
for empirical work overstated. The use of one concept or the other does not even reflect 
                                                        
1 We cannot here revise the specific advantages and shortcomings related to these various denominations. 
Let us just state that we chose to retain the term of Global Value Chains because it is the most widely used, 
the less theoretically charged and, more positively, because of the emphasis put on value, which points to 
both productive dynamics and distributional stakes. On October 29 2015, a Google search obtained 
382,000 results for « global value chains », 112,000 for « global production networks », 42,700 for « global 
commodity chains » and 22,300 for « trade in tasks ». 
 
 real divergences concerning the conceptualization of chain governance, specifically the 
attention that different authors pay to inter-organizational dynamics along the chain 
versus the role of structural power relations shaped by institutional settings and 
deliberate actions of non-firm actors such as NGOs, unions and states (Bair and 
Palpacuer, 2015).   
 
We contend that at the root of this conceptual disarray lies a very basic problem of 
definition.  What is a global value chain? GVCs are most of the time defined in the 
literature in a descriptive manner, for example as “the full range of activities that firms 
and workers perform to bring a specific product from its conception to its end use and 
beyond” (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2011). In addition to its lack of analytical content, 
such a definition raises immediately the problem of the frontiers of GVCs. If this concept 
refers to the international segmentation of value producing activities, it must also 
address the distinctiveness of the economic relations involved in GVCs vis-à-vis other 
economic relations, and thus the frontier of the chains. 
 
Property rights theorists emphasize this aspect when they state that trade within global 
value chains is qualitatively distinct from trade in final goods because transactions 
involving intermediate inputs “tend to be associated with longer time lags between the 
time the order is placed (and the contract is signed) and the time the goods or services are 
delivered (and the contract executed), and they also often entail significant relationship-
specific investments and other sources of lock in on the part of both buyers and suppliers” .  
The advantage of such a definition is that it tries to capture the economic specificity of 
economic relations within global value chains. However, it reduces its content to 
characteristics of production processes in terms of asset specificities and duration and 
solely considers the efficiency of transaction arrangements, ignoring the role of power 
relations and strategic behaviors in the enforcement and reproduction of these 
arrangements and the subsequent socio-economic outcomes2. In order to capture social 
and economic principles supporting relations along global value chains, one needs to 
conceptualize them as a “form of industrial organization” (Milberg and Winckler, 2013, p. 
19) or, more precisely, a form of the division of labor characterized by distinctive 
modalities of coordination and power relations.    
 
 
1.2. Global value chains as a form of the division of labor 
 
Most of the theoretical discussion concerning global value chains has focused on 
industrial governance issues and specifically on  « (1) how exchanges between actors at 
different links in a chain are coordinated; (2) who among the participants in the chain is 
able to define and/or control the process of coordination; and (3) what the 
consequences are of these coordinating activities for chain participants in terms of the 
distribution of risk and reward » (for the main references see Bair and Palpacuer, 2015 : 
S3). These are crucial issues to understand contemporary development patterns. 
However, how to address them depends on the very delimitation of value chains.  
                                                        
2 For a general discussion about the achievements and the limitations of transaction cost economics see 
the book coordinated by Christos Pitelis (Pitelis, 1994). 
 Our definition of a global value chain is rooted in the concept of the network firm 
(Chassagnon, 2014; Powell, 2003). The latter differs from other forms of industrial 
organization in that it describes a vertical network of firms with complementary assets 
and skills that coordinate through various cooperation mechanisms, power exploitation 
being one of the main ones. However, we push the argument further, by stating that 
asymmetric economic relations are related to uneven control over the production 
process itself, below the legal frontier of the firm (within dispersed affiliates of TNCs) 
and beyond the legal frontier of the firm (with subcontracting and retailing networks).  
Consequently, we propose to consider global value chains as a specific form of the 
division of labor, distinct from two archetypical forms: the division of labor within a 
single establishment unitary firm typical of nineteenth century capitalism and the 
division of labor driven by horizontal market mechanisms (Table 1). However, rather 
than relying on the distinction between markets and hierarchies made by transaction 
costs theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1983), we build on the Marxian distinction 
between the technical and social division of labor, i.e. the division of labor within a given 
manufacturing process versus the broader division of labor in society as a whole 
(Chavance, 2009; Marx, 1981). Both forms of the division of labor contribute to the 
refinement and development of production as famously stated by Smith in The Wealth of 
the Nations (Smith, 1776). However, Marx points out that these forms of the division of 
labor are not only different in their scale (the unitary firm versus society) but because 
they rely on fundamentally distinct social principles and thus encounter very different 
socio-economic problems: the product is a commodity in the social division of labor but 
not within the firm; the coordination results from a priori planning in the unitary firm 
while it is mediated by prices and validated only following the process of production 
within the social division of labor; ownership of the means of production is unified 
within the manufacturing process while dispersed in the case of the social division of 
labor; means of production and labor are allocated proportionally to the requirement of 
the planned production process in manufacturing and as a function of the hazardous 
competition process in the case of the social division of labor. Contemporary forms of 
capitalist organization move beyond this binary structure with formally independent 
firms being incorporated in production networks where capitalist functions related to 
the organization of the labor process and the appropriation of profit are unevenly 
distributed (Bettelheim, 1970, p. 123). 
Global Value Chains are a form of the division of labor that takes place within such 
production networks – whether or not directly internal to a transnational corporation 
(TNC) - in which geographically dispersed productive entities contribute to the making 
of a commodity3.  Within value chains, “incomplete commodities” are functionally 
integrated in order to make complete commodities, which will be sold and used beyond 
the chain. The criterion to consider a product as an incomplete commodity is that its 
potential value realization outside the chain would be lower than within it. To put it 
differently, because of their complementarity, the diverse products circulating within a 
                                                        
3 Elements of this analysis were previously traced in Aglietta’s analysis of sub-contracting networks 
(Aglietta, 1979); on the related issues of possession and economic property relations see (Bettelheim, 
1976; Lipietz, 1989; Poulantzas, 1976). 
 
 value chain have a higher value when they are combined than if they were sold 
separately. This complementarity manifests at a deeper level the fact that a variegated 
set of command mechanisms allows lead firm(s) 4  to shape the labor process 
(technology, labor standards, etc.) within the network and that internal or transfer 
prices along the chain gives lead firm(s) the ability to capture part of the profits 
generated in formally autonomous entities. The frontier of a given value chain is reached 
when price mechanisms become disconnected from the command over production 
parameters; the product then becomes a (full) commodity.  
 
In sum, GVC-related trade organizes an institutional and economic production space 
where one (or a small number of) lead actor(s) exert(s) economic power to (partially) 
centralize profits and control(s) to some degree the labor process over geographically 
and often legally dispersed productive units. The allocation of labor and means of 
production within the chain results both from the hazardous process of vertical 
competition between unevenly powerful and relatively autonomous entities and from 
explicit strategic planning by the lead firm(s). The coordination is thus dominated by 
cybernetic just in time planning, incorporating prices, quantities and qualities data. 
Of course, a crucial specificity of contemporary global value chains is that they are 
structured at the global or regional level. This trans-nationalization means that uneven 
factor endowments and institutional settings between countries are key drivers of value 
chains dynamics while they are in the meantime affected through a feedback loop by 
these same dynamics. 
 
Table 1: Technical, social and value chain divisions of labor 
Division of labor  TECHNICAL SOCIAL VALUE CHAIN 
SCALE Unitary firm Society Production network 
PRODUCT Not a commodity 
Intermediary use-value 
without exchange value 
Commodity 
Use-value with exchange 
value 
Incomplete commodity 
Intermediary use-value 
with a formal/coerced 
exchange value (intra-
chain internal or transfer 
price) 
 
MEDIATION  Command and control 
Top-down orders along 
the management 
hierarchy 
Prices 
A priori horizontal 
between market 
participants 
Mixed  
Asymmetric prices and 
command and control 
relationships between 
lead actor(s) and 
relatively autonomous 
peripheral actors 
 
COORDINATION A priori A posteriori Cybernetic just in time 
planning by lead 
firm(s) 
 
OWNERSHIP OF THE 
MEANS OF PRODUCTION 
Unified Dispersed Geographically and 
(often) legally 
dispersed 
 
                                                        
4 By lead firm we consider the dominant firm in the network or the parent company in the case of intra-
TNC transactions.  
  
ALLOCATION OF LABOR 
AND MEANS OF 
PRODUCTION 
Proportional Hazardous, regulated 
by horizontal product 
competition 
Hazardous, regulated 
by vertical factor 
competition 
 
 
2. A critical reappraisal of GVC measurement 
 
2.1. How to measure GVC participation?  
 
The prevailing state of ambiguity concerning the conceptualization and definition of 
GVCs finds its mirror image in the eclecticism seen in approaches toward GVC 
measurement. We contend, however, that our understanding of GVCs as a specific form 
of the division of labor in contemporary capitalism allows us to posit a measure of GVC 
participation that is more precise than those currently used in the literature.  
 
To take an example of some of the imprecision involved on the measurement side of the 
literature, a recent UNCTAD (2013: x) World Investment Report dedicated to global value 
chains estimates that “TNC-coordinated GVCs account for some 80 percent of global 
trade.” Although this figure has subsequently entered the literature as an estimate of the 
extent of global GVC trade (Abdulsamad et al., 2015, p. 1; Elson, 2013, p. 49; Yeung and 
Coe, 2015a, p. 30), it is actually an estimate of the percentage of international exchanges 
that feature TNCs as either buyer or seller (UNCTAD 2013: 135-136). Yet the use of TNC 
presence is at best a poor proxy for GVC trade from our point of view, as it 
simultaneously casts the net too wide, insofar as TNCs must still purchase some full 
commodities, notably primary products, through market and price revelation processes 
symptomatic of a social division of labor; and too narrow, insofar as an international 
exchange between two domestic (non-TNCs) firms could be coordinated inside a GVC, 
particularly toward its lower nodes.   
 
A more common standard of measurement in the literature – indeed one used in the 
very same UNCTAD report (2013: 170) for estimating GVC participation at the country 
instead of the global level – is that of vertical specialization (VS). Defined as the import 
content of exports, or the foreign value-added content of total exports, vertical 
specialization aims to gauge how dependent a country’s export sector is on foreign 
inputs. Since (Hummels et al., 2001, pp. 81–82) suggested the inclusion of forward 
participation in vertical specialization (the export of goods that become inputs in 
another country’s exports), which they label VS1, it has become the norm for VS and VS1 
to be taken as the measure of a country’s (backward and forward) participation in GVCs 
(De Backer and Miroudot, 2014, p. 10). Using such a measure, most countries count 
somewhere between 30 to 60% of their gross exports as GVC related trade, that is, 
either VS or VS1 (de Backer and Miroudot 2014: 11-12). For the world as a whole, the 
share of global trade that is GVC related peaks at around 52 percent in 2008 (Gangnes et 
al., 2015, p. 114). 
 
Nonetheless, as with the TNC proxy measure offered by UNCTAD, the combination of VS 
and VS1 as a proxy for GVC trade leaves considerable room for further precision in light 
 of the conceptualization of the frontiers of GVC activity offered in this article. Figure 1 
below decomposes a given country’s total imports and exports in a way that highlights 
the differences between our conceptualization of GVC trade and the standard VS + VS1 
measure. 
 
 
Figure 1: What counts as GVC trade out of a country’s total international trade 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 1, the full measure that we use for the rate of GVC 
participation is as follows: 
 
Equation 1: GVC participation rate 
 
(𝐷𝑉𝐴 𝑖𝑛 𝑋) ∗ (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑋) + 𝑖𝑝𝑀 ∗ (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑀)
𝐺𝐷𝑃
 
 
 
Where “DVA in X” is domestic value added in gross exports, “ppX” is the share of primary 
products in total exports, “ipM” is gross imports of intermediate products and “ppM” the 
share of primary products in total imports 
 
Two key differences are immediately noticeable between the approaches that allow for a 
more precise measurement of GVC participation. First of all, there is the distinction 
between primary and non-primary products. Overlooked by the standard measurement, 
this distinction results from our conceptualization of GVCs as a form of division of labor 
whose frontiers end where market coordination dominates, i.e. where negotiations 
 between sellers and buyers are limited to prices and payment conditions and where 
pricing is revealed more through market mechanisms than direct firm-to-firm 
negotiations. This is all largely the case for primary products due to their unique use-
values, which by nature differ from secondary products in terms of being rigidly local in 
terms of where they need to be produced, notably homogenous in composition and 
therefore relatively impervious to product differentiation, and generally inflexible 
regarding the duration of their production and therefore the time required to bring new 
products to market. Largely for these reasons, Kalecki considered that primary products 
tended to be exempted from cost-determined pricing (Lavoie, 2015, pp. 125–126). In the 
case of GVCs, we should note that the specifically local conditions of their production 
render their geographical fragmentation generally impossible, while the unusually long 
and inflexible length of their production cycle renders their extra-market coordination 
problematic (Dicken, 2011, pp. 253–271), and their specific role as an asset class on 
financial markets further removes pricing from inter-firm negotiations in a potential 
GVC (Newman, 2009, pp. 550–556). Of course, this is not to say that no primary product 
may be organized, produced and sold in a GVC division of labor, but rather that their 
general existence as full commodities beyond the frontiers of GVC pressures will lead to 
more precise estimates of GVC participation if they are excluded. An additional benefit of 
excluding primary products in this manner is that it avoids misleading conclusions for 
commodity exporting countries with inflated GVC participation as well as value capture 
figures that would have been more of a result of the timing of the 2000s commodity 
boom (Powell, 2015) as it relates to the time period of our data than to dynamics in 
global value chains themselves. 
 
The second noticeable difference that we have with the standard measurement is our 
inclusion of all imports and exports of non-primary products as GVC trade, with the 
exception of the direct import of a finished product for domestic use. While the 
literature prefers that a product has crossed at least two borders in order to classify it as 
part of a GVC (Hummels, Ishii and Yi 2001: 76), (Wang et al., 2016, p. 14) note that a 
broader definition of GVCs would include goods that have not necessarily crossed two 
borders. The narrow preferences of the two border rule in the standard measurement 
leads to the omission of much GVC trade, as it classifies all exports as non-GVC related 
for the penultimate country in a GVC (that is, the final exporter of either a finished good 
or an intermediate input that is absorbed in the host country without further 
international trade) because of the lack of certainty that such a good involved more than 
two countries. The same is true for the importer on the opposite side of the transaction. 
Yet in our conception of GVCs, what matters is not the number of countries that were 
involved in a GVC but the type of relations involved in the command over production. 
And unlike the case for primary products, which are exempted for special reasons 
explained above, all firm activity in exporting or importing secondary goods today, the 
vast majority of such sales involving trans-national corporations (UNCTAD 2013: 135-
136), can be assumed to have been organized in GVC relations.  
 
As can be seen, the only exception in our conceptualization of treating secondary goods 
trade as GVC trade is the case of an import of a finished good for direct consumption. 
This is because the statistical category in question (imports of finished goods) is not able 
to distinguish between imports of finished goods for direct use, and imports of finished 
secondary goods by a firm to be sold domestically. The latter could be assumed to be 
GVC related for the importing country to the extent that the retailer contributes to the 
 very definition of the product itself, but not the former. Therefore, the exclusion of this 
category undoubtedly misses much GVC related trade for a given country; for example, 
Walmart or Ikea’s imports of finished products for retail trade. Nonetheless, this is a 
limitation that is shared with the standard measure. Given that this category is the only 
one where such ambiguity exists – in other types of imports and all types of exports it is 
clear that a commercial firm is doing the buying or selling – we decided to exclude it in 
order to under rather than over-estimate the extent of GVC participation. 
 
One last difference between our measure and the standard in the literature that is not 
observable in figure 1 is that we have opted to obtain a ratio for GVC participation 
through dividing by GDP rather than following the usual practice of dividing by gross 
exports. This is because our purpose is not that of seeing how much of world trade has 
become GVC trade, but is rather in looking at the developmental effects of the GVC 
division of labor in a world where successfully linking into GVCs is standard policy 
advice and indeed has become “nearly synonymous with economic development itself” 
(Milberg and Winkler 2013: 238). From this point of view, the level of openness to GVCs 
is gauged relative to the economy itself rather than relative to whatever happened to be 
the pre-existing weight of exports in the economy. In other words, our indicator can be 
interpreted as a measure of the value involved in GVC trade relative to the value created 
in a country, i.e. relative to the size of a country’s economy.  
 
2.2. How to measure value capture? 
 
The current approaches to measuring country gain from GVC trade are even more varied 
than approaches to GVC participation. While our choice to use a value capture measure 
as a country gain indicator has been used in previous literature (Jiang and Milberg, 
2012; Milberg and Winkler, 2013), others argue against its use. The case against the 
value capture indicator is that a reduced share of value captured domestically can occur 
along with upgrading in other senses, especially if there is a deepening of technological 
sophistication in activities performed (UNCTAD 2013: 172). A stronger rejection of both 
sophistication and value added understandings of upgrading comes from (Kowalski et 
al., 2015, pp. 7, 33), who argue that volume can be as important as value, or that “a 
smaller share of a larger pie” is better because “important benefits can be derived from 
specializing in less sophisticated assembly activities according to comparative 
advantages and performing them on a large scale.”  Some alternative measures 
employed range from sophistication of exports and per capita domestic value added in 
exports (Kowalski et al. 2015) to, more commonly, GDP per capita (OECD et al., 2014, p. 
18; UNCTAD, 2013, pp. 150, 170). 
  
Yet while it is true that there can be a “short-term trade off” in potentially entering an 
“upgrading path” through increased GVC participation that reduces the share of 
domestic value capture (UNCTAD 2013: 170-172), there are nonetheless major 
problems with discarding value capture in favor of alternative indicators unrelated to it.  
Exports can be sophisticated because foreign inputs are, but that does not mean the 
exporting country keeps the value it exports. There could be an upgrading mirage. 
Second, simply increasing per capita domestic value added in exports (“a bigger pie”), 
something every single country in our sample has unsurprisingly accomplished during 
an era where world trade has mostly outpaced GDP growth (Escaith and Miroudot, 
 2015), does not necessarily translate into industrial upgrading in the way it is normally 
considered in the literature. Indeed, whatever its benefits in terms of expanding 
economic activity, the growth of volume of sales at low-value added levels of a value 
chain is identified in the literature as a new form of “thin industrialization” or a “low-
level equilibrium trap” that is associated precisely with an inability to upgrade (Milberg 
et al., 2014, p. 171). Third, growth in GDP per capita can be attributed to many factors. 
The papers that use this indicator do not control for these other factors. Value capture 
rates are a more direct economic outcome of GVC participation, and therefore a more 
precise measure. 
 
Our proposed measure of value capture in GVC trade is the ratio of domestic value-
added in GVC exports to total GVC related trade (Figure 2). Along with maintaining our 
exclusion of primary product trade from our conception of GVC activity, the other 
distinguishing characteristic of our value capture measure is that we consider the ratio 
of domestic value-added in exports not only to that of foreign value-added in exports 
(i.e. re-exported intermediate inputs, the standard measure (UNCTAD 2013: 150) but 
also to that of imported intermediate inputs absorbed domestically.  
 
 
Figure 2: Measuring a country’s gain from GVC trade – rate of value capture 
 
 
The formula that emerges to calculate the value capture rate, therefore, is as follows: 
 
Equation 2: Value capture rate 
 
(𝐷𝑉𝐴 𝑖𝑛 𝑋) ∗ (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑋)
(𝐷𝑉𝐴 𝑖𝑛 𝑋) ∗ (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑋) + 𝑖𝑝𝑀 ∗ (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑀)
 
 
Where “DVA in X” is domestic value added in gross exports, “ppX” is the share of primary 
products in total exports, “ipM” is gross imports of intermediate products and “ppM” the 
share of primary products in total imports 
 
 As the reader can notice, the numerator of Equation 2 corresponds to the total value 
captured by a country when exporting non-commodity products and the denominator to 
the total value of GVC-related trade as defined above (the numerator of Equation 1). 
 
The reason for including domestically absorbed intermediate imports in our GVC gain 
ratio stems directly from our above conceptualization that sees all secondary goods 
trade (excluding the import of finished goods) as GVC trade. Thus, this type of GVC 
import represents a real cost that could offset some of a country’s gains in terms of 
capturing value through GVC exports. In the case of some countries where the cost of 
such imports is particularly high due to an underdeveloped domestic input sector, 
omitting domestically absorbed intermediate imports from the denominator of the value 
capture measure would therefore give an unrealistically high value capture rate. 
Including such real costs of GVC participation as well as the gains from value capture in 
exports provides a more precise measure of the real gains from participation. 
 
3. Stylized facts on the link between GVC participation and value 
capture 
 
Having developed what we believe are more accurate indicators of GVC participation 
and GVC-related direct economic benefits (our version of the value capture rate 
indicator) than the ones currently used in the GVC empirical literature, we will revisit 
the link between GVC participation and value capture. We will show that, contrary to 
what the prevailing view describes (Kowalski et al., 2015; OECD et al., 2014, 2013; 
UNCTAD, 2013), there is not a straightforward positive link between GVC participation 
and direct economic benefits. 
 
The link between GVC participation and value capture can be analyzed in two non-
contradictory ways: statically and dynamically. The first approach comes down to 
answering, for a specific period the question “are countries that participate the most in 
GVCs the ones that capture more value?”. The second approach (the dynamic approach) 
asks a similar question that introduces time in the analysis: “are countries that have 
increased their participation in GVCs during a certain period (for example, between 
1995 and 2008) the most also the ones whose value capture has increased the most?”.  
In this section we will analyze the above-mentioned link by employing both a static and 
a dynamic approach and using the indicators we developed in the previous section. 
 
3.1. A non-existent static link between GVC participation and GVC value capture 
 
Let us first begin with the static approach. The simplest and most effective way to apply 
it empirically consists of making, for several periods, regressions between the GVC 
participation and the value capture indicators to see if there is a correlation between the 
two. If it is the case, the sign, the magnitude and the reliability of the correlation should 
be studied.  
 
 Figure 3 shows the scatter plots between these two indicators for 59 countries5 in four 
stages of the development of GVCs: 1995, 2000, 2005 and 20116. Linear correlation 
lines7 are drawn along with their corresponding correlation coefficients (R squared). 
 
Figure 3: Scatter plots, linear correlation lines and R squared between GVC participation and GVC value 
capture rates for the years 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2011 
 
 
  
It is clear from the shape of the scatter plots and the virtually null correlation 
coefficients that there is no static relation between GVC participation and GVC value 
capture. 
 
 
                                                        
5 This is the number of countries for which there is available data to build the two indicators. These 59 
countries account for at least 90% of global GDP, exports and imports in every year analyzed. The data are 
presented in section 6 below. 
 
6 There is available data to build the same scatter plots for years 2008, 2009 and 2010. The results 
obtained for those years are very similar to the ones presented in this paper. 
 
7 Although polynomic regressions offer higher R squared, the latter are not statistically significant for the 
years 1995, 2000 and 2005. 
 3.2. A non-existent dynamic link between GVC participation and GVC value 
capture 
 
We will now study if there is a dynamic link between GVC participation and value 
capture. We will use the longest possible period that can be analyzed with the available 
data on trade in value added: 1995 to 2011. For each of the 59 countries for which it is 
possible to build the indicators described in the previous section, we calculate the 
absolute evolution of the GVC participation and the GVC value capture rates between 
1995 and 20088. Then we compare them to the sample’s mean. If the evolution of the 
variable is higher than the average we classify it as “high” and if not we label it “low”. 
Four possible combinations between high/low evolutions in GVC participation and GVC 
value capture rates emerge from this classification. Table 2 shows the percentage of 
countries of the sample that belong to each category. 
 
 
Table 2: Distribution of the evolution of GVC participation and GVC value capture rates between 1995 and 
2008 
 
 
 
Table 2 shows that the virtuous GVC integration case in terms of value capture (high 
increase in GVC participation coupled with high growth in the GVC value capture rate – 
lower-right cell-) is the least common one. Failed cases of GVC integration (lower-left 
cell) are just as common. Moreover, success cases are more frequent in countries that 
have integrated into GVCs less than the average (upper-right cell). Finally, the most 
common case is the failed low integration (upper-left cell). Nevertheless, the differences 
between the frequencies of each case do not suggest a general trend; they do not exceed 
20 percent. The general conclusion to be drawn from Table 2 is that there is no general 
outcome in terms of value capture when countries integrate strongly or weakly into 
GVCs. 
 
It is pertinent to wonder nonetheless if there is something like a “dominant strategy” 
regarding GVC participation. In other words: is it always more convenient in terms of 
value capture for a country to undertake a process of high (low) integration rather than 
a process of low (high) integration into GVCs? In order to answer this question we 
calculate the success rates of each of these strategies. This comes down to calculating 
what percentage of the countries with a low (high) GVC participation rate evolution 
obtained a high increase in their GVC value capture rates. The success rate obtained for 
countries with low GVC participation evolution is 45 percent while the one for countries 
with high GVC participation evolution is 43 percent.  
 
                                                        
8 Although there is available data to do the same calculations from 1995 to 2011, we decided to cut-off the 
endpoint in 2008 in order to avoid including years in which the values of the two variables are highly 
altered because of the effects on world trade of the financial crisis, as explained in subsection 6.1. 
Low High
Low 36% 29%
High 20% 15%
GVC participation 
evolution
GVC value capture evolution
 We can conclude that, contrary to the prevailing view in the recent empirical literature 
(Kowalski et al., 2015; OECD et al., 2014, 2013; UNCTAD, 2013), larger involvement in 
GVCs does not necessarily bring about economic benefits. Nonetheless, the contrary is 
not true: smaller involvement in GVCs does not necessarily bring about economic 
benefits either. Moreover, neither strong nor weak evolutions (decreases in many cases) 
in GVC participation seem to be a better strategy to increase value capture. Therefore, 
the reasons for success and failure in terms of value capture are not to be found in the 
deepness of the GVC integration process but rather in qualitative differences between 
integration patterns.  
 
Additionally, although we believe that value capture is a major outcome of GVC 
integration to take into account, it is not the only one. Social and productivity outcomes 
should also be analyzed in order to grasp in a more comprehensive way the effects of 
GVC integration (Kowalski et al., 2015). Having this in mind, we will proceed in the next 
two sections to analyze both theoretically and empirically GVC development patterns. 
4. Varieties of development patterns in GVCs 
 
The mainstream story about GVC development patterns describes a rosy scenario where 
a country improves its economic and social situation as it increases its participation in 
global value chains (Kowalski et al., 2015; OECD et al., 2014, 2013; UNCTAD, 2013). The 
theoretical linkages underpinning this rosy scenario are generally not made explicit but 
are nonetheless derived from the comparative advantage argument about the benefits of 
specialization and the opportunities of knowledge spillovers (Romer, 1993). They could 
be summarized in this way: a country increasingly engaged in global value chains 
benefits from productivity spillover thanks to learning processes and cheaper inputs; 
this translates into greater domestic value-added and trickle-down into the economy 
through higher profits and investments, higher wages and higher tax collection, which 
altogether contribute to improved socioeconomic outcomes. However, as stated by 
(Milberg and Winkler, 2011), such a dynamic is far from automatic; economic upgrading 
is not a given and it is not necessarily associated with social upgrading. 
 
Figure 4 proposes a stylized representation of GVC participation dynamics beyond the 
rosy scenario.  
 
Figure 4 : GVC participation dynamics beyond the rosy scenario 
 
 
 First of all, it stresses that GVC related gains do not necessarily result from productivity 
improvements linked to specialization and/or knowledge spillovers. Indeed, GVC 
participation could lead to greater value capture thanks to the exercise of market power. 
Such market power could be related to economic barriers to entry or to an asymmetric 
political structure resulting in the protection of standards and intellectual property-
rights. In such cases, benefits from GVC participation do not result from higher 
productivity but from the ability to extract rent from foreign actors, an idea already 
raised by dependency theorists (Palma, 1978). For example, the ability of global buyers 
to benefits from cheaper inputs could be completely disconnected from any productive 
improvement, in which case its overall impact will depend on the distribution and the 
uses of the gains (Milberg, 2008; Milberg and Winckler, 2013). 
 
A second shortcoming of the rosy scenario is that it overlooks the possibility of 
immiserizing growth processes. Immiserizing growth occurs when an increase in quality 
or quantity of output resulting from productivity gains is more than compensated by 
diminishing prices, resulting in lower value capture. In such cases greater productive 
efficiency does not translate into greater economic gains but rather leads to social 
downgrading as previous uses of resources have been disrupted by the involvement in 
GVCs (Kaplinsky, 2004, 2000; Kaplinsky et al., 2002; Mohan, 2016).  
 
A third limitation is that even in the case of value accrual thanks to productivity gains or 
market power, social upgrading is far from evident. Indeed, if these economic gains are 
captured by capital, they could fuel higher inequalities and limit the spillover effect that 
should increase the population’s income. Moreover, higher profits do not necessarily 
translate into higher investment – they could result in higher financial payments, which 
means that the overall impact on employment is not straightforward. Thus, as a result of 
greater inequalities or unproductive uses of profits, greater value capture resulting from 
GVC participation can be associated with social downgrading. Positive socioeconomic 
outcomes necessitate that labor, which represents the bulk of the population, manages 
to capture part of the gains, either directly through higher wages or, indirectly, through 
tax-funded public welfare. For such an outcome to occur, the key mechanisms are a 
higher labor demand resulting from productive uses of profits and workers’ ability to 
mobilize some structural and/or associational power (Selwyn, 2013).  
 
 
This stylized analysis allows for a variety of GVC participation regimes summarized in 
Table 3. In the rosy scenario GVC participation translates into higher productive 
efficiency, greater value capture and positive socioeconomic outcomes. Profit-led 
upgrading means that higher participation is related to increased productive efficiency 
thanks to higher profits and investment. Social outcomes are negatively impacted by the 
diminishing wage share but the overall impact depends on the effects of investment on 
employment and wages. Overall social impact is also undetermined in the case of 
Rentier’s integration, where greater GVC participation results in higher value capture as 
a result of market power exertion; social outcomes depend on the distribution of income 
between wages and profits and on the distribution of profits between investment and 
financial payments. Immiserizing growth indicates a configuration where productivity 
gains related to increased GVC participation and domestic investment do not result in 
higher value capture, nor social upgrading. We consider also the possibility of Non-GVCs-
led dynamics where socioeconomic outcomes in terms of productive development and 
 social upgrading do not result from greater GVC participation nor increased value-
capture.  
 
 
Table 3: Varieties of GVC participation regimes 
 
 
 
In the next section we will empirically test the existence of the differentiated GVC 
development patterns summarized in Table 3 in order to see if they are corroborated or 
not as well as if any other patterns emerge to be observed. 
5. Data and indicators 
 
As scholars have recently begun to point out, the link between GVC participation and 
domestic share of value added that has emerged at the empirical level as a standard of 
interpretation in terms of countries benefitting or not from GVCs is too narrow to 
capture the multi-dimensional processes involved in economic and social development 
more broadly (Milberg and Winkler 2013; Kowalski et al. 2015). At the theoretical level, 
among the standard types of upgrading in the literature – process, product, functional 
and chain upgrading – Kowalski et al. (2013: 32) note that “the process upgrading path 
above explicitly refers to efficiency while the product, functional and chain upgrading 
refer to the type of activities performed in value chains without an explicit reference to 
value creation or productivity”. Yet this same study goes on to use per capita domestic 
value added as an indicator of productivity (33-36), rendering it theoretically impossible 
to account for any possible immiserizing growth or rent leakages in the mainstream GVC 
story (see Figure 4 above). 
To disentangle these distinct mechanisms and achieve a more multi-dimensional picture 
of upgrading or downgrading in GVCs, we decided to complement GVC indicators in 
terms of participation and value capture with independent indicators to capture the 
dimensions of the growth of the productive structure of a country as well as to capture 
the social outcomes observed during the transformations wrought by the globalization 
of global value chains. 
 
  ROSY SCENARIO PROFIT-LED 
UPGRADING 
RENTIER’S 
INTEGRATION  
IMMISERIZING 
GROWTH 
NON-GVCS LED 
DYNAMICS 
GVC 
PARTICIPATION 
+ + + + - 
VALUE 
CAPTURE/ADDITIO
N 
+ + + - - 
PRODUCTIVE 
DEVELOPMENT 
+ + - + ? 
SOCIOECONOMIC 
OUTCOMES 
+ ? ? - ? 
 We will now provide information on the indicators chosen for each of these dimensions 
as well as the sources used to collect the data. 
 
5.1. Value-added trade data 
 
Data are available for value added trade from OECDStat’s Trade in Value Added (TiVA) 
database for only 61 countries, plus a “rest of the world” observation which is too broad 
to be of use. As both of the GVC participation and value capture variables are 
indispensable to the analysis and dependent on the existence of value-added trade data, 
our data selection is necessarily limited to these 61 cases where such data are available.  
After gathering data for productive investment and our social upgrading indicators, 
discussed below, eight of these 61 cases were eliminated from our data set due to the 
non-availability of data present across more than one indicator, rendering statistical 
estimation unreliable. Two countries, Bulgaria and Latvia, were detected to be outliers 
in terms of investment rates. After trying several unsuccessful methods to deal with the 
outlying values of these two countries for that variable (replacing by the second highest 
value of the sample, replacing by the mean; eliminating them and estimating the missing 
values) we decided to exclude them from the sample. Indeed, when included, their 
particularly high scores in investment rates deformed the country-composition of the 
clusters by over emphasizing the weight of investment rates. We are therefore left with 
51 countries in our data set, listed in full in the statistical annex. 
 
The time period available in the same TiVa database are the years from 1995 to 2011. 
The starting point of 1995 follows the practice of other studies examining the evolution 
of the GVC era (De Backer and Miroudot, 2014; Timmer et al., 2014) and is also very 
close to the beginning of the era of the rapid take-off of GVC expansion in the early 
1990s (Milberg et al., 2014, p. 151). We decided to cut off the end point at 2008 in order 
to avoid that the end point data would reflect the idiosyncrasies in patterns of world 
trade following the 2008 financial crisis, as world trade was severely restricted in 2009 
and had not sufficiently recovered or settled into new observable trade patterns by the 
2011 end point in the TiVA data (Donnan, 2016). 
 
 
5.2. GVCs Indicators  
 
Having already described the first two indicators in detail in section 3, here we will just 
recall that the GVC participation rate is defined as the sum of the non-primary product 
portion of domestic value added in exports plus intermediate imports over GDP, while 
the value capture rate is defined as the non-primary product portion of the domestic 
value added content of exports over the non-primary product portion of total exports 
plus intermediate imports. The sources for both variables come primarily from the 
OECD’s TiVA database, with supplemental information on the share of primary products 
in a country’s imports and exports taken from UNCTADStat, and GDP figures for the GVC 
participation denominator taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
More information on the sources for these variables is located in the statistical annex. 
 
 
 5.3. Productive investment 
 
Gross capital formation was taken as an indicator of the scope of productive investment 
in an economy and its growth alongside the evolving relations with GVCs, a process 
distinct from whatever the trends may be with regard to value capture. The specific 
indicator is “total investment (percent of GDP)” from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
database, defined as “the total value of the gross fixed capital formation and changes in 
inventories and acquisitions less disposals of valuables for a unit or sector,” all in 
current local currency.  
 
The use of gross capital formation as a proxy for investment is generally taken as a more 
reliable indicator of long-term structural changes in productive capacity and capital 
accumulation (Duménil and Lévy 2013; Husson 2008) with more relevance for 
economic development than  measures such as total factor productivity (Felipe and 
McCombie, 2003). The main limitation with the measure relates to the inclusion of 
residential investment which could make it difficult to distinguish real capital 
accumulation from real estate bubbles. Gross capital formation also does not take into 
account the original level of capital stock which can be assumed to vary enormously 
between countries. Both of these limitations are obviously to be kept in mind while 
interpreting the results. 
 
5.4. Social outcomes 
 
Due to the multifaceted nature of what might be involved in “social upgrading” (Milberg 
and Winkler 2013: 251), we chose four separate indicators that all capture important 
aspects of “wages, employment, and social standards” (238), without being directly 
reducible to each other.  
 
Employment rate 
 
The employment rate indicator was taken from the “labor force participation rate, total 
(% of total population ages 15-64)” data provided by the World Bank, defined as “the 
proportion of the population ages 15 to 64 that is economically active: all people who 
supply labor for the production of goods and services during a specified period” (World 
Bank, 2016). 
 
This indicator was chosen instead of a simple unemployment rate figure because of the 
huge problem of informality in developing countries, making a cross-country 
comparison of unemployment rates of dubious value. To take an example, India has a 
mere 4.1 percent unemployment rate in the same World Bank database for 2008, and 4 
percent for 1995, performing significantly above the average in both years as well as for 
the percentage change between the two years. Yet the LABORSTA (ILO, n.d.) database 
has 84 percent of India’s non-agricultural workforce in informal employment in 2009. 
While a reliable measure of total formal employment as a percentage of the working age 
population would therefore be ideal, the lack of sufficient data in the ILO database or 
elsewhere makes the World Bank’s “labor force participation rate” the best available 
indicator (India scores, more realistically, significantly below average with this 
indicator). 
 Median income 
 
Median income was chosen as a measure of the improvement or lack thereof in real 
income for the median individual in a given country’s income distribution. It was chosen 
for this purpose as a more precise measure than average income, which is subject to 
relative variations in top incomes. The data comes principally comes from combining 
two sources: the Luxembourg Income Study for countries where data is available, and 
the World Bank’s PovcalNet database for the remainder of countries. The methodology 
of combining the two sources follows that of the Pew Research Center (Kochhar, 2015), 
and has also been employed in a similar manner by (Hellebrandt and Mauro, 2015). 
Rates of change were calculated by putting both the 1995 and 2008 figures in constant 
2005 local currency units. The final 2008 value computed in order to create the 
composite variable (see methodology section below) was put in 2011 PPP dollars for 
international comparability. See the annex for further details, including the eight 
countries where other data sources were used for lack of information in the LIS and 
PovcalNet databases, including two of which needed to be estimated by the NIPALS 
method. 
Gini coefficient 
 
The Gini coefficient was used as a general measure of inequality in a country. Since, 
unlike the other variables, a lower Gini score reflects a better outcome (in this case, 
lower inequality), the Gini score was accordingly adjusted in order to vary in the same 
direction as the other variables (so that a higher score reflects a better outcome). In the 
case of the rate of change, this was done by the formula: (2008 Gini / 1995 Gini) – 1. In 
the case of the 2008 value for the composite measure (see below), this was done by the 
formula: 100 – 2008 Gini. 
 
In terms of the calculations to get the Gini coefficients, these were in the vast majority of 
cases computed with the same income distribution data that provided the median 
income values (principally the Luxembourg Income Study and PovcalNet data: see annex 
for details).  
 
Labor’s share of income 
 
As the Gini coefficient is unable to distinguish between trends in primary and secondary 
income flows, labor’s share of income was also taken as a measure of the balance of 
power between capital and labor in the production process itself. The data were taken 
from OECDStat’s “labour income share ratios – total economy” for most OECD countries 
and from the data set constructed by Katharina van Treeck that measures labor’s share 
in low and medium income countries (Trapp, 2015). Since the database that van Treeck 
constructed is more robust and finely attuned to the reality of extensive self-
employment in many developing economies, data were taken from this data set 
whenever they were available in both data sets. The remainder of countries were taken 
from OECDStat.  In the case of four countries where data was not available in either data 
set, the values were estimated using the NIPALS method (see annex for further details). 
 
 
 5.5. Summary of the indicators 
 
Table 4 succinctly summarizes the above described indicators used in our empirical 
analysis as well as the sources from which each of them were retrieved or from which 
they were built. 
 
The data described was transformed in order to perform the PCA. For every variable, the 
original data corresponds to the percentage increase between 1995 and 2008. Yet, using 
merely percentage increases would have made comparisons between countries 
misleading since the starting and final values of variables vary significantly between 
countries and, therefore, relative increases are not comparable when we take into 
consideration what they represent. For example, for China the variable 
INVESTMENT_RATE increased by only 8% during the above-mentioned period, which is 
little more the sample’s mean. Nevertheless, an 8% increase in investment in a country 
like China, which had an astonishing average investment rate of 36.5% of GDP between 
1995 and 2008, represents a considerable increase: it is difficult to increase investment 
by much when investment rates are already huge.  The same argument can be held for 
the other variables. For this reason, we decided to use an index that weights percentage 
increases by the end value of each variable, i.e., its value in 2008. In order to conserve a 
reasonable equilibrium between the two, we decided to weight each of them by 50%. 
Since percentage increases and end values are expressed in different units, we first 
standardized both of them and then did a mean of the two to obtain the index. Thus, for 
any variable X we have: 
 
 
Equation 3: General equation to calculate the indexes used in the PCA 
 
INDEX_X = ST(VAR_X_DELTA) * 0.5 + ST(VAR_X_2008) * 0,5 
 
Where ST() stands for the standardization of the value between brackets, 
“VAR_X_DELTA” is the percentage increase between 1995 and 2008 of variable X and 
“VAR_X_2008” stands for the value of variable X in 2008. 
 
In order not to over-represent social variables in our analysis, we chose to create a 
composite “SOCIAL_INDEX” variable that contains the four above-mentioned social 
variables. Indeed, had we included the four social variables in the PCA, the social 
dimension of the analysis would have accounted for most of the variables in the PCA (4 
out of 7), which would have over-emphasized the importance of social outcomes in GVC 
development patterns. Since we wanted to give each of the dimensions of integration 
patterns summarized in Table 4 (participation, value capture, investment and social) the 
same weight, a composite social variable seemed like the best choice. In order to build 
the indicator, we first created an index for each independent social variable following 
the methodology described in Equation 3. Then, we did a mean of the 4 social variables 
that resulted in the composite variable “SOCIAL_INDEX” used in the PCA. It is worth 
noticing that alternative PCAs that included the four separate social variables instead of 
a composite social variable where performed and, in those cases, median income, gini 
and labor share where correlated and represented in the same side of the same axis, 
though it was not the case for employment rate in all of the alternative PCAs. This 
confirmed our choice of using a composite social variable. 
 Table 4: Criteria of development patterns. Definition and sources 
  
 
 
6. Principal component analysis 
 
 
6.1. Outline of the evolution of the variables 
 
Before performing the principal component analysis (PCA), we take a look at the 
direction in which the analyzed variables evolved in order to provide a first glance of the 
general trends. 
 
 
 
Table 5 : Distribution of country evolution and mean percentage change between 1995 and 2008 for each 
indicator 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 shows some general trends in the variations of the raw variables analyzed. As 
expected, participation in GVCs increased for the vast majority (84%) of the countries 
and on average by 29%. On the contrary, value capture decreased for 73% of them, 
although the mean decrease is negligible (-4%).  The investment rate, the employment 
rate and especially median income increased for most of the countries and on average.  
PARTICIPATION
VALUE 
CAPTURE
INVESTMENT 
RATE
LABOR 
SHARE
EMPLOYMENT 
RATE
GINI (-1)
MEDIAN 
INCOME
Percentage of 
countries with 
positive evolutions
84% 27% 67% 22% 76% 53% 88%
Percentage of 
countries with 
negative evolutions
16% 73% 33% 78% 24% 47% 12%
Mean percentage 
change
29% -4% 10% -6% 3% 0% 37%
 Indicators Sources Indexes 
 
INVESTMENT 
 
Investment/GDP 
 
 
IMF World Economic 
Outlook 
 
INVESTMENT_INDEX 
VALUE CAPTURE See above formula 
 
OECDStat / UNCTADStat    VALCAPT_INDEX 
SOCIAL  Median Income 
Employment rate 
Wage share 
Gini 
LIS / PovcalNet 
World Bank 
OECDStat, Trapp 2015   
LIS / PovcalNet 
 
   SOCIAL_INDEX 
 
GVC PARTICIPATION 
 
See above formula 
 
OECDStat / UNCTADStat 
/ World Bank 
   
   PART_INDEX 
 It is worth noticing that the two variables chosen to measure inequality, the labor share 
and the Gini index, tell different stories. Measured in terms of labor share, we could say 
that inequalities increased in 78% of the countries and rose by 6% on average, whereas 
using the Gini coefficient, inequalities rose in roughly half of the countries and did not 
evolve on average.  This reinforces our decision to include both variables to measure 
inequality.  
 
6.2. Methodology 
 
The main objective of this paper is to show both theoretically and empirically that GVC 
integration patterns are not homogenous but rather diverse in terms of development. 
This means that integration into GVCs, be it slow or fast, can bring about different 
combinations of outcomes in terms of value capture, investment and social variables. In 
this sense, and following a critical realist approach (Lawson, 1997), we consider that 
regressions are not suited to show this diversity. This is because, when applied to 
heterogeneous countries, they assume that the relations between variables are the same 
for all of them, which is exactly what we argue against. The lack of correlation between 
GVC participation and value capture shown in section 4 exhibits the limitations of 
traditional regressions to capture what we want to capture. 
 
On the contrary, a principal component analysis (PCA) is perfectly suited to capture 
heterogeneity of behaviors between variables (participation, value capture, investment, 
etc.) among groups of observations (countries). We will therefore perform a PCA and, 
based on the results, follow up with a cluster analysis that will make the empirical 
identification of differentiated GVC integration patterns possible. 
 
 
It is also worth mentioning that when the PCA was performed with only percentage 
increases as the input variables, the variable composition of the axes remained very 
similar to the one described in this paper. This shows that the PCA is robust and that the 
use of the above-mentioned index only affects the position of the countries along the 
axes. 
 
Three axes were retained in the PCA for three reasons. First, following the Kaiser 
criterion (Kaiser, 1960), axes F1, F2 and F3 were the ones with eigenvalues above 1. 
Second, while the decrease in eigenvalues from F1 to F3 where smooth, the decrease 
from axis F3’s eigenvalue to axis F4’s was sharp, which indicates that axes F1 to F3 
should be retained (see the Annex). Third, taking axes F1, F2 and F3 provided significant 
correlations (over 0,76) between axes and at least one of the variables. Had we taken 
only two, the variable SOCIAL_INDEX, would have been virtually uncorrelated with the 
axes while it is very strongly correlated (0,97) with axis F3.   
 
No rotations were applied because the information concentrates in the first three axes 
showed virtually no increase when rotations where tested.  
 
 
 
 6.3. Results 
 
The information contained in the three retained axes concentrated 83.14% of the 
variables’ information.  
 
Figure 5 shows the correlation circle on axes F1 and F2 that resulted from the PCA, 
while Table 6 shows the coordinates of the variables for each axis. Particularly positive 
or negative coordinates are shown in bold9. 
 
Figure 5: Correlation circle on axes F1 and F2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Factor loadings of each variable for axes F1, F2 and F3 
 
 
Table 6 shows that the right side of axis F2 is strongly characterized by the variable 
VAPCAPT_INDEX and that the variable SOCIAL_INDEX is highly represented on one side 
                                                        
9 As the reader will notice by observing the lower-right cell of Table 6, the variable SOCIAL_INDEX is very 
highly correlated with axis F3. The variable factors map being two-dimensional, this correlation cannot be 
visualized in Figure 5. 
F1 F2 F3
PART_INDEX 0,76 0,36 0,20
VALCAPT_INDEX 0,03 0,91 -0,15
INVESTMENT_INDEX 0,78 -0,37 0,04
SOCIAL_INDEX -0,19 0,08 0,97
 of axis F3. Both PART_INDEX and INVESTMENT_INDEX are associated with the right 
side of axis F1. Although these two variables have coordinates of 0.36 and 0.37 
respectively in axis F2, they should nonetheless not be interpreted as being associated 
with axis F2, since, as shown in Table 7, the share of their information contained in axis 
F2 is small. 
 
Table 7: Contributions of the variables to axes F1, F2 and F3 in percentage points 
 
  
Some preliminary conclusions can be made before analyzing the positions of the 
countries in the PCA through a cluster analysis.  First, the fact that PART_INDEX 
VALCAPT_INDEX and SOCIAL_INDEX are represented along different orthogonal axes 
indicates that these three variables are independent of each other. This confirms the 
results of section 4. In other words, it seems like there is no link between GVC 
participation, value capture and social outcomes. Second, INVESTMENT_INDEX and 
PART_INDEX being both associated with the right side of axis F1 indicates that, in 
general terms, countries that have increased their participation indexes the most are 
also the ones that have increased their investment indexes the most. Bearing in mind 
that the indexes are made of the percentage increases of the variables and their final 
values in equal parts, this can be interpreted in two non-mutually exclusive ways: 
countries that have most increased their participation in GVCs are either countries that 
have also seen the largest increases in their investment rates in percentage terms 
and/or they are countries that had large investment rates in 2008. 
 
7. Cluster analysis 
7.1. Methodology 
 
A first cluster analysis was performed applying the agglomerative hierarchical 
clustering (AHC) method to the coordinates of each observation in the three axes 
retained. Three classes were found to be statistically similar. We then performed a 
cluster analysis using the k-means method on the coordinates of the observations in 
axes F1, F2 and F3 with an open rage of classes from 1 to 5. The result was again 3 
classes. Therefore, we chose to perform the same k-means clustering to obtain 3 classes, 
which had been tested to be the statistically reliable number of classes. Tests in which 
we performed the k-means clustering to obtain 4 and 5 classes gave us results with very 
uneven numbers of observations by classes and in many cases blurry variable 
compositions of classes, corroborating that 3 classes was the right choice.  
 
 
F1 F2 F3
PART_INDEX 47,4 12,0 4,1
VALCAPT_INDEX 0,1 75,2 2,3
INVESTMENT_INDEX 49,7 12,2 0,1
SOCIAL_INDEX 2,8 0,6 93,5
 7.2. Results 
 
As said in the previous subsection, a k-means clustering was performed on the 
coordinates of the observations in axes F1, F2 and F3 in order to obtain 3 classes.  
Table 8 shows the country composition of each class along with the number of countries 
in each, the sum of weights, within-class variance, and minimum, average and maximum 
distance to centroid for each class. 
 
Table 8 : Country composition of the classes and statistical results by class (World Bank countries 
abbreviations) 
 
 
We shall now study the variable composition of each class in order to interpret the 
characteristics of each of these 3 country groupings in terms of GVC development 
patterns. 
 
In order to do so, we calculated the mean value of the 4 variables used in the PCA for 
each class and compared them to the sample mean. Given that the raw variables were 
standardized in order to build the indexes, the mean is equal to 0 for each index. Figure 
6 shows the results of these calculations in a radial graph.  
 
 
 
 
 
Class 1 2 3
Sum of weights 14 16 21
Within-class variance 1,56 1,89 2,00
Minimum distance to centroid 0,40 0,52 0,37
Average distance to centroid 1,11 1,27 1,23
Maximum distance to centroid 2,40 2,01 2,74
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 Figure 6: Mean value of each variable by class and for the sample 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 shows, class 1 is characterized by a very small increase in GVC participation 
and value capture, an average increase in investment and a high increase in social 
variables. Taking into account the country composition of the class, two different 
trajectories that converge into the same GVC development pattern can be construed.  
 
The first one corresponds to a “GVC resource curse” and applies to countries like 
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Indonesia, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Russia. 
Here the countries are net primary commodity exporters10 that benefited from the 
historically exceptional increase in the international prices of commodities. Given the 
definition of our indicators, this implies a disengagement from GVCs and a loss in value 
capture coming from GVCs. Investment did not particularly evolve because of this 
dynamic but, on the contrary, the policies and social dynamics that took place between 
1995 and 2008 contributed to the use of these commodity-related income gains to 
obtain social improvements in terms equality, gains in median income and employment. 
 
The second trajectory found in this first cluster is that of peripheral European countries 
that benefited up to the crisis from foreign financial inflows which allowed temporary 
social improvements (Stockhammer et al., 2016). These countries lagged behind in GVC 
participation and economic upgrading, which led to underperformance in terms of GVC-
related value capture. Yet, this brought about a flow of financial-related income that was 
distributed in a way that median income increased and inequalities decreased. In the 
case of Greece, Spain and Portugal, they benefited from capital inflows during their 
integration into the European Union and the Eurozone and, by that means, were able to 
                                                        
10  UNCTAD data presented for the early 2010s in “Commodity dependency” (Economist, 2015) 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/08/commodity-dependency  
 undergo a process of social upgrading. Nonetheless, this process adversely affected their 
competitiveness and resulted in a lag in GVC participation and economic upgrading. The 
severe economic crises these countries are undergoing since 2008 illustrate the mirage-
like quality of the non-GVCs led social upgrading path of class 1. 
 
 
Class 2 is characterized by medium-low scores in GVC participation and investment 
rates coupled with an average score in the social variable and a very positive evolution 
in terms of value capture. The countries that constitute this class are mainly developed 
countries11. This suggests a trajectory characterized by a slow increase in GVC 
participation but in which participation was increasingly concentrated in the tiers of 
value chains that are able to capture more value.  Given that these countries have been 
developed for decades if not centuries, they already had developed productive 
structures that allowed them to achieve highly profitable positions in GVCs without a 
sharp increase in investment. A comparison between the average social index score of 
these specific countries (Figure 6) and the average evolution and the distribution 
between positive and negative evolutions of the individual social variables for the 
sample as a whole (see Table 5) suggests that the populations of these countries 
benefited from an increase in median income compatible with their sharp increase in 
GVC-related value capture but that employment did not increase much and inequality 
did not change or even increased, depending on the case; hence the average social index 
score. In this sense, we can think of this dynamic as a reproduction of the core 
trajectory: the most developed countries in 1995 did not increase their GVC 
participation as much as others during the globalization boom, yet they were able to 
capture more value than the others. 
 
Class 3 is characterized by very high scores in GVC participation and investment rate, an 
average score in value capture and low scores in social terms. The countries that 
compose this class are developing countries mainly from Asia and Eastern Europe that 
in many cases were starting to undergo a process of reintegrating into capitalism after 
decades of socialist regimes. Their economies opened sharply and they joined the 
globalization boom by participating strongly in GVCs, which, consequently, implied 
sharp increases in their investment rates in countries that had weak productive 
structures in 1995.  Value capture decreased slightly in contrast to countries of class 2 
(“reproduction of the core”).  Moreover, in terms of the social upgrading this GVC 
development pattern was not beneficial: inequalities increased more than in any other 
group of countries, median income saw an average increase despite the strong 
integration process they underwent and employment evolution was virtually null, 
clearly the slowest compared to the other two classes. 
 
                                                        
11 Indeed, some of the countries in this class (Brazil, Colombia, Cambodia, Philippines and Turkey) are 
developing countries with heterogeneous development patterns. Their belonging to class 2 illustrates the 
limitations of cluster analyses made on observations’ factor scores in a PCA. The grouping and its 
consequent class variable composition reflect general trends in the observations of the sample, but each 
class’ characteristics cannot be interpreted straightforwardly to be fully representative of every 
observation (country) of the class concerned. Nevertheless, the homogeneity of the development pattern 
between the developed countries of class 2 that is explained in this section accounts for two thirds of the 
observations of the class, which makes our characterization of the “reproduction of the core” development 
pattern reliable. Moreover, the reader should bear in mind that, as explained above, the three groups 
clustering choice was verified to be the most prudent one. 
 8. Discussion 
 
Our PCA and cluster analyses indicate three main development patterns in GVCs 
between 1995 and 2008: Social upgrading mirage, Reproduction of the core and 
Immiserizing growth.  These observed patterns could be contrasted to the diversity of 
potential GVC participation regimes identified at the theoretical level (Table 3 and Table 
9).  
 
Table 9: The complementarity of observed development patterns 
 
  REPRODUCTION OF 
THE CORE 
RENTIER’S 
INTEGRATION  
IMMISERIZING 
GROWTH 
SOCIAL UPGRADING 
MIRAGE  
NON-GVCS LED 
DYNAMICS 
GVC 
PARTICIPATION 
+/- + - 
VA CAPTURE + +/- - 
PRODUCTIVE 
DEVELOPMENT 
- + +/- 
SOCIOECONOMIC 
OUTCOMES 
+/- - + 
 
 
 
The first striking fact is the absence of the rosy scenario and the profit-led upgrading 
patterns, which suggests that the preferred option of the mainstream literature might 
not be as relevant as generally admitted.  
 
A second element sheds an interesting light on these absences: the apparent 
complementarity between the three regimes revealed by the polarization in each of the 
dimensions of our typology, which suggests that development patterns in GVCs need to 
be understood as constitutive parts of a global process of uneven development. The 
overall picture that emerges is that of a reproduction of the core where value capture is 
disconnected from productive development measured in terms of investment. The 
counterpart of this privilege of the core is a process of immiserizing growth in peripheral 
countries where rapid insertion in GVCs is related to a marked effort in terms of 
productive development but poor social outcomes. Interestingly, the best social 
outcomes seem related to a relative insulation from GVC dynamics. However, we called 
this configuration a Social- upgrading mirage because it rests mostly on external - non-
GVCs related - conditions of possibility which are, on the one hand, the commodity boom 
and, on the other hand, financial inflows.  
 
With this overall picture in mind we can come back to our initial conception of GVCs as a 
specific form of the division of labor. Such a conceptualization allows for an original 
understanding of the diversity and complementarity of uneven development patterns 
along value chains. These uneven development patterns typically result from the fact 
that GVCs delineate transnationally fragmented labor processes, often dispersed among 
formally independent entities, that are nonetheless to some degree economically unified 
 under a dominant locus of valorization. Market power positions reflect some degree of 
control over labor processes that descends along the chains and allows value capture at 
considerable geographical remove from the countries where productive development 
takes place. This focus on fragmented-unified valorization processes also sheds a new 
light on social outcomes. They cannot directly be deduced from GVC participation and 
can only be understood if one takes into account the distribution of capitals’ powers 
along the chain in addition to other dimensions such as the institutional set of 
constraints and regulations or the position of labor at the point of production.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In order to overcome the disjuncture between theoretical development in GVC literature 
and macro, multi-country measurements, this contribution presented an original 
theoretical conceptualization of GVCs as a form of the division of labor, some new 
indicators of GVC participation and value capture, new stylized facts about the relation 
between value capture and GVC participation and a preliminary empirical inquiry into 
the different patterns of development along GVCs.  
 
Focusing on GVC dynamics at the macro-level, our PCA and cluster analysis indicate 
three main patterns of development in GVCs between 1995 and 2008: Social upgrading 
mirage, Reproduction of the core and Immiserizing growth.  Contrary to the mainstream 
narrative about the uniformly positive effects of GVC participation, we show a more 
nuanced reality where gains from GVC participation are unevenly distributed between 
and within countries and points to the complementarity of the diverse GVC development 
patterns reflecting the specificities of the global division of labor within value chains.  
 
This paper thus identifies economic mechanisms that are difficult to disentangle through 
case studies and do not suffer from the selection biases inherent to such a methodology. 
We hope that it will contribute to new avenues for theoretical discussions and empirical 
inquiries within the GVC community. In such a perspective, one should bear in mind that 
two crucial dimensions of the problem are missing in this analysis. The first one is 
financialization dynamics, which are relevant at the level of the uses of profits by lead 
firms and as a countervailing force of productive and social dynamics. We have only 
alluded to it here, but it needs to be properly articulated with the analysis of GVC 
development patterns. The second is the environmental dimension. Indeed, the uneven 
distribution of ecological costs of production along the chains is a crucial aspect of 
development patterns and their respective prospects. 
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Annex 
 
 
 
The annex is divided into two parts. The first one refers to the construction of the raw 
indicators analyzed in section 4 and with which the indexes used as variables for the 
PCA were built. Information about sources, data treatment and all the methodological 
choices made to build the database are detailed for every raw indicator. The second part 
offers more statistical outputs of the PCA that have not been included in the paper. 
 
 
1. Raw indicators 
 
1.1. Country coverage 
Regarding country coverage, the following eight cases were excluded from our data set 
despite being available in the OECD TiVA data set, owing to the non-availability of data 
across more than one variable used in the social upgrading field: Brunei Darussalam, 
Cyprus, Hong Kong, Lithuania, Malta, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Taiwan. A full list of 
countries in our data set is found below in the “Social Indicators Data Table.” 
 
 
1.2. GVC participation 
 
The formula to determine the GVC Participation rate, as mentioned in sub section 3.1 of 
the paper, is: 
 
(𝐷𝑉𝐴 𝑖𝑛 𝑋) ∗ (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑋) + 𝑖𝑝𝑀 ∗ (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑀)
𝐺𝐷𝑃
 
 
 
Where “DVA in X” is domestic value added in gross exports, “ppX” is the share of primary 
products in total exports, “ipM” is gross imports of intermediate products and “ppM” the 
share of primary products in total imports 
 
Domestic value added content of gross exports and gross imports of intermediate 
products are taken from OECDStat’s Trade in Value Added (TiVA) database, October 
2015 version, in US dollars. The shares of primary products in total exports and imports 
are taken from UNCTADStat. Primary commodities, precious stones and non-monetary 
gold (SITC 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 68 + 667+ 971) as total volumes in US dollars of exports 
and imports for each country were made into shares by dividing by total exports and 
 imports in US dollars from the same database. GDP figures are from the World Bank’s 
“GDP at market prices (current US$)” variable in its World Development Indicators data 
set, and are given in current prices converted into US dollars through the exchange rate. 
 
For this indicator there were no missing data points, nor was there a need for any 
additional treatment of the data, with the exception of the treatment of the outlier 
Cambodia, whose rate of change between 1995 and 2008 was more than 4 times higher 
than the second highest value in the entire data set. The percentage change between 
1995 and 2008 for Cambodia was therefore replaced by the second highest variable in 
order to not overly skew the results. 
 
1.3. Value capture 
 
The formula to determine value capture or the GVC gain rate, mentioned in subsection 
3.2 of the paper, is: 
 
 
(𝐷𝑉𝐴 𝑖𝑛 𝑋) ∗ (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑋)
(𝐷𝑉𝐴 𝑖𝑛 𝑋) ∗ (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑋) + 𝑖𝑝𝑀 ∗ (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑀)
 
 
 
Where “DVA in X” is domestic value added in gross exports, “ppX” is the share of primary 
products in total exports, “ipM” is gross imports of intermediate products and “ppM” the 
share of primary products in total imports 
 
The sources for domestic value added content of gross exports, the share of primary 
products in total exports and imports, and gross imports of intermediate products are 
the same as used to construct the GVC participation indicator. 
 
For this indicator there were no missing data points, nor was there a need for any 
additional treatment of the data. 
 
1.4. Productive investment 
 
For this indicator there were no missing data points, nor was there a need for any 
additional treatment of the data, with the exception of the treatment of the outliers 
Bulgaria and Latvia. Due to an unusually low starting point in 1995, which is highly 
likely to be an underestimate, Bulgaria would have had a rate of change more than four 
times the second highest value, Latvia, itself already 41.5 percent higher than any other 
value in the data set. After trying several methods to deal with these outlying values 
(replacing by the next highest value of the sample, replacing by the mean; eliminating 
them and estimating the missing values) that nonetheless continued to over-weight the 
role of the variable INVESTMENT_INDEX in the PCA and, especially, in the country-
composition of the classes that emerged from the clustering based on the PCA, we 
decided to exclude both Bulgaria and Latvia from the sample. 
  
 
 
 1.5. Social Indicators 
 
Employment rate 
 
For this indicator there were no missing data points, nor was there a need for any 
additional treatment of the data. 
 
Median income 
 
As mentioned in the paper, the method of coming up with median income figures for 
such a wide range of countries follows exactly the methodology employed by the Pew 
Research Center (Kochhar 2015). This entails combining Luxembourg Income Study 
data, all of which is disposable household income data, with PovcalNet data for countries 
unavailable in the Luxembourg Income Study data set, some of which is income and 
some of which is consumption data, according to the survey year and country.  
 
PovcalNet data came from the query of the database by Dykstra, Dykstra and Sandefur 
(2014) where “the population of each country is divided into 10,000 equal-size groups, 
where each group represents 0.01% of a country’s population. The groups are ranked by 
per capita income or consumption” (Kochhar 2015). The median income score was 
taken as the 50th percentile of these 10,000 equal-size groups, which is not a precise 
median at the individual level but the closest thing available for many developing 
countries (Kochhar 2015). For greater comparability the Luxembourg Income Study 
data was treated in the same way, splitting the distribution into 10,000 equal size 
groups and taking the 50th percentile of these groups. Since the PovcalNet data is given 
at the level of individuals rather than households or equivalized scales, the Luxembourg 
Income Study data was also taken at the individual level by dividing each observation’s 
disposable income total (which is at the household level) by the variable “number of 
household members” in order to transform the individual household observation into 
multiple numbers of individual observations (as many as exist in a given household) 
with the same individual income level (that of their household divided by its number of 
members). As with the methodology of the Pew Research Center, this method is not able 
to capture economies of scale inside households, and thus likely overestimates the real 
income gap between wealthy countries with smaller family units and poorer countries 
with larger ones (Kochhar 2015). This is the main data limitation for the median income 
variable, along with the potential incompability of taking consumption data in the 
countries where it was presented and income data in others. Nonetheless, combining 
income and consumption data for cross country comparisons in this manner is common 
in the literature (Birdsall, 2010; Hellebrandt and Mauro 2015). Furthermore, since both 
of the listed limitations barely enter the picture when the rate of change inside one 
country is measured between two years, rather than the comparison between countries 
at a given year’s values, these limitations are strongly mitigated in our analysis since the 
variable that eventually entered our principal component analysis is 50 percent 
determined by the rate of change in a given country between 1995 and 2008.  
 
In all cases for both the median incomes and the GINI indicators, data was taken as 
available as close as possible to the years 1995 and 2008, up to 3 years before or after 
 the benchmark years (i.e. from 1992 to 1998 and from 2005 to 2010). For the median 
income, if the reported data came from one of the surrounding years that was not the 
benchmark year, it was extrapolated to the benchmark year following Kochhar’s method 
of assuming an annual rate of change equal to 70 percent of the change in real household 
consumption expenditures, with the data taken from the World Bank’s “household final 
consumption expenditure per capita growth (annual %)” variable in its Data Catalog. 
 
All data was put in 2005 constant local currency prices in order to compare the rate of 
change between 1995 and 2008, and the 2008 values were put into 2011 international 
PPP dollars in order to have a comparable figure between countries for the 50 percent 
weight with final values that entered the principal component analysis. These 
conversions were done using the World Bank’s International Comparison Program 2005 
PPP to local currency convertors where applicable (that is, for all PovcalNet data since it 
is reported in 2005 PPPs) and the World Bank data catalog’s “consumer price index 
(2010=100)” both to put non-PovcalNet data in 2005 local currency units and to bring 
all 2008 data to 2011 local currency units in order to use the 2011 International 
Comparison Program PPP (Table R3, “individual consumption expenditure by 
households”) convertors to put the values into 2011 PPP dollars. Where data was 
missing from the World Bank’s consumer price index, the IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook Database (updated on January 19, 2016) was used for the same purpose (this 
was the case for Argentina, Chile, and China).  
 
In addition to these adjustments, other adjustments that were necessary included 
multiplying the PovcalNet figures by 12 (they are reported as monthly estimates) to get 
a yearly estimate comparable with the Luxembourg Income Study data, and using 
Eurostat’s “former euro area national currencies vs. euro/ECU – annual data” convertors 
in cases where the reported data of countries was done in the old national currency of 
countries who now use the Euro (and thus the 2011 PPP convertor is in Euros). This was 
the case for the 1995 values for Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Spain, in order to put them in 1995 local Euros 
before bringing them to 2005 Euros to make the rate of change calculation.  It would 
have been done for the 1995 value with Slovenia as well, but the result gave an 
unreliable estimate (a 30% decrease in median income between 1995 and 2008), so the 
rate of change was estimated instead (see below table) while the Euro reported 2008 
value was deemed reliable. Late Euro adopters Estonia and Slovakia were treated 
differently, since not only their 1995 values but also their 2008 values were reported in 
their pre-Euro local currency. Their 1995-2008 rates of change were therefore 
calculated by leaving both years in 2005 pre-Euro local currencies, while their 2008 
final values were converted to Euros in order to make the 2011 PPP estimate. 
 
If reported values for any countries were available for both 1995 and 2008 from both 
the Luxembourg Income Study and the PovcalNet database, the LIS data was chosen as 
more consistent with the rest of the dataset. The only exception here is Mexico, where 
there was a large difference between the numbers given by the LIS and the PovcalNet 
database concerning the rate of change between 1995 and 2008 – an astronomical 122 
percent increase with LIS data versus a below the mean 25 percent increase with 
PovcalNet data. Given what is known about Mexican real income stagnation during this 
period (CONEVAL 2014: 51), the LIS data was deemed unreliable (in all likelihood the 
LIS 1995 figure is far too low, since the 2008 values themselves in 2011 PPP dollars are 
 not very different, PovcalNet’s are even a bit higher -- $2,556 PPP versus $2,492 PPP). 
The PovcalNet data were therefore used uniquely in Mexico’s case when both PovcalNet 
and Luxembourg Income Study data were available. 
 
If values were not available for both years in either the Luxembourg Income Study or the 
PovcalNet database, the best alternative estimate consistent between the two years was 
sought, and statistical estimation was used in the cases where nothing could be found 
(some combination of finding other sources or using statistical estimation occurred for 
only 9 out of 51 countries). Table 10 below describes the data used for every country for 
both median incomes, Gini values, and labor’s share of the income, along with the years 
of the reported data (the column is for the median income and Gini variables, where 
there was more variation, while any variation from 1995 or 2008 for labor’s share is 
noted inside the labor’s share column itself) and whether there were any complications 
and, if so, how they were handled: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 10 : Social indicators data table 
 
Country
Country 
code
Median income source Type of data / complication GINI Source
Years of 
reported 
data
Labor’s Share 
Source
Argentina ARG PovcalNet Income Same as median 1995, 2008
Trapp 2015 
(2008 not 
available, 2007 
used)
Australia AUS
Luxembourg Income 
Study
Income Same as median 1995, 2008 OECD Stat
Austria AUT UNU Wider – WIID 3.3
Income (Available for 1995 only in the 
LIS, but not taken since it is available for 
both years from the same source from the 
European Commission gathered by the 
WIID database, which makes the rate of 
change calculation more reliable)
Luxembourg Income Study is available for 1995 but not for 
2008. For 2008, it is listed at 27.8 by two different data sets 
gathered by the “all the Ginis” (Milanovic) database, with a 
close number from yet another in 2005 and no far away 
values, so the 27.8 figure was taken.
1995, 2006 
for median 
income. 
1995, 2008 
for GINI.
OECD Stat
Belgium BEL UNU Wider – WIID 3.3
Income (Available for 1995 only in the 
LIS, but not taken since it is available for 
both years from the same source from the 
European Commission gathered by the 
WIID database, which makes the rate of 
change calculation more reliable)
Luxembourg Income Study is available for 1995 but not for 
2008. For 2008, it is listed at 28.5 by two different data sets 
gathered by the “all the Ginis” database, with a close 
number from yet another in 2005 and no far away values, 
so the 28.5 figure was taken.
1995, 2006 
for median 
income. 
1995, 2008 
for GINI.
OECD Stat
Brazil BRA PovcalNet Income Same as median 1995, 2008 Trapp 2015
Cambodia KHM PovcalNet Consumption Same as median 1994, 2008
No data 
available
Canada CAN
Luxembourg Income 
Study
Income Same as median 1994, 2007 OECD Stat
Chile CHL PovcalNet Income Same as median 1994, 2009 Trapp 2015
China CHN PovcalNet Consumption Same as median 1996, 2008 Trapp 2015
Colombia COL PovcalNet Income Same as median 1996, 2008 Trapp 2015
Costa Rica CRI PovcalNet Income Same as median 1995, 2008 Trapp 2015
Croatia HRV PovcalNet Consumption Same as median 1998, 2008
Trapp 2015 
(1995 and 
2008 not 
available; 1996 
and 2007 
used)
Czech Republic CZE
Luxembourg Income 
Study
Income Same as median 1996, 2007
Trapp 2015 
(2008 not 
available, 2005 
used)
Denmark DNK
Luxembourg Income 
Study
Income Same as median 1995, 2007 OECD Stat
Estonia EST
Luxembourg Income 
Study / PovcalNet
1995 value from PovcalNet, consumption; 
2008 value from Luxembourg Income 
Study, income
Same as median 1995, 2007
Trapp 2015 
(2008 not 
available, 2005 
used)
Finland FIN
Luxembourg Income 
Study
Income Same as median 1995, 2007 OECD Stat
France FRA
Luxembourg Income 
Study
Income Same as median 1994, 2010 OECD Stat
Germany DEU
Luxembourg Income 
Study
Income Same as median 1994, 2007 OECD Stat
Greece GRC
Luxembourg Income 
Study
Income Same as median 1995, 2007
OECD Stat 
(1995 value is 
an estimated 
value by OECD 
Stat)
Hungary HUN
Luxembourg Income 
Study
Income Same as median 1994, 2007
Trapp 2015 
(2008 not 
available, 2006 
used)
Iceland ISL
Luxembourg Income 
Study
Income (to calculate the final 2008 value. 
However, as no data is available for the 
years surrounding 1995, the rate of 
change between 1995 and 2008 needed 
to be estimated).
The final 2008 value could be calculated with the 2008 LIS 
data. However, due to the lack of a 1995 estimate 
anywhere, the rate of change between 1995 and 2008 was 
estimated.
2007
OECD Stat 
(1995 is an 
estimated 
value by OECD 
Stat)
India IND PovcalNet Consumption Same as median 1993, 2009 Trapp 2015
Indonesia IDN PovcalNet Consumption Same as median 1996, 2008
No data 
available
Italy ITA
Luxembourg Income 
Study
Income Same as median 1995, 2008 OECD Stat
Ireland IRL
Luxembourg Income 
Study
Income Same as median 1995, 2007 OECD Stat
Israel ISR
Luxembourg Income 
Study
Income Same as median 1997, 2007 OECD Stat
Japan JPN UNU Wider – WIID 3.3
Income. However, given that the data 
provided was at the household level 
without available information on the 
micro level regarding persons per 
household, the figure was divided by the 
1995 average household size in Japan 
(NIPPSR 1998) and the 2010 average 
household size in Japan as a proxy for 
2008 (Gu et al. 2015).
The GINI is available to calculate from LIS for 2008 only. 
For 1995, the “all the Ginis” database provided 4 sources 
with very close estimates for 1993 and one outlier for 
1994. An average of the 1993 estimates was taken.
1995, 2006 
for median 
income data. 
1993, 2008 
for the GINI 
calculation.
OECD Stat 
(1995 is an 
estimated 
value by OECD 
Stat)
Luxembourg LUX
Luxembourg Income 
Study
Income Same as median 1994, 2007 OECD Stat
Malaysia MYS PovcalNet Income Same as median 1995, 2007
No data 
available
Mexico MEX PovcalNet Income
LIS data was available for both years, the only country with 
both years available in both the PovcalNet and LIS 
databases. LIS data was deemed reliable for the income 
dispersion to calculate GINIs. But PovcalNet was more 
reliable for the absolute levels of median income.
1994, 2007 
for median 
income. 
1994, 2008 
for GINI.
Trapp 2015
Netherlands NLD
Luxembourg Income 
Study
Income Same as median 1993, 2007 OECD Stat
  
 
 
Country Country code
Median 
income 
source
Type of data / complication GINI Source
Years of 
reported 
data
Labor’s Share 
Source
New Zealand NZL
UNU Wider – 
WIID 3.3
Income (Not available near the years desired in either 
LIS or PovcalNet, data comes from OECDStat gathered by 
the WIID database). Due to its consistency it was used to 
calculate the rate of change. However, given that it was 
household reported income and not individual income, 
the 2008 income level was estimated in order to 
construct the composite variable of 2008 final value + 
rate of change between 1995 and 2008
Due to the consistency of the source reporting 
the GINIs for 1995 and 2008 in the WIID 
database, coupled with the larger variation 
around 1995 in the different sources reported in 
the “all the Ginis” database, the WIID estimates 
were taken for both 1995 and 2008.
1995, 2008 OECD Stat
Norway NOR
Luxembourg 
Income Study
Income Same as median 1995, 2007 OECD Stat
Philippines PHL PovcalNet Consumption Same as median 1994, 2009 Trapp 2015
Poland POL
Luxembourg 
Income Study
Income Same as median 1995, 2007 Trapp 2015
Portugal PRT
UNU Wider – 
WIID 3.3
Income (Not available near the years desired in either 
LIS or PovcalNet, data comes from the European 
Commission gathered by the WIID database)
Due to the consistency of the source reporting 
the GINIs for 1995 and 2008 in the WIID 
database, coupled with the non-availability of 
data in the “all the Ginis” database, the WIID 
estimates were taken for both 1995 and 2008.
1995, 2006 OECD Stat
Romania ROU PovcalNet Consumption Same as median 1998, 2008 Trapp 2015
Russia RUS PovcalNet Consumption Same as median 1996, 2008 Trapp 2015
Slovakia SVK
Luxembourg 
Income Study
Income Same as median 1996, 2007
Trapp 2015 (2008 
not available, 2006 
used)
Slovenia SVN
Luxembourg 
Income Study
Income (However, the rate of change was estimated, 
because there seems to have been a problem with the 
1995 data for Slovenia in LIS, thus making a rate of 
change calculation difficult although the 2008 data is 
reliable for the final 2008 value).
Luxembourg Income Study (the problem with 
the 1995 data for Slovenia relates to the absolute 
magnitude of the 50
th
 percentile value and not to 
the relative dispersal of income among the whole 
population, so it was still considered reliable to 
calculate the GINI.
1997, 2007 OECD Stat
South Africa ZAF PovcalNet Consumption Same as median 1995, 2008 Trapp 2015
South Korea KOR
Data not 
available
Estimated
The GINI is available to calculate from LIS for 
2008 only. For 1995, the “all the Ginis” database 
provides two estimates with the same figure for 
1998, one of which also provides a 1993 
estimate.  The 1993 estimate was therefore 
taken.
1993, 2006 
for GINI.
OECD Stat
Spain ESP
Luxembourg 
Income Study
Income Same as median 1995, 2007 OECD Stat
Sweden SWE
Luxembourg 
Income Study
Income Same as median 1995, 2005 OECD Stat
Thailand THA PovcalNet Consumption Same as median 1994, 2008 Trapp 2015
Tunisia TUN PovcalNet Consumption Same as median 1995, 2010 Trapp 2015
Turkey TUR PovcalNet Consumption Same as median 1994, 2008
Trapp 2015 (2008 
not available, 2006 
used)
United 
Kingdom
GBR
Luxembourg 
Income Study
Income Same as median 1995, 2007 OECD Stat
United States USA
Luxembourg 
Income Study
Income Same as median 1994, 2007 OECD Stat
Vietnam VNM PovcalNet Consumption Same as median 1998, 2008 No data available
OECD StatSwitzerland CHE
Report – 
“L’évolution 
des inégalités 
de revenus 
en Suisse”
Income (Available for 1995 only from the LIS, but not 
taken since it is available for both years from the same 
source as an individualized income through the 
household equivalence scale, the best available data to 
calculate an internally consistent rate of change)
Luxembourg Income Study is available for 1995 
but not for 2008. For 2008, it is listed at 32.3 by 
two different data sets gathered by the “all the 
Ginis” database, without any far away values 
from other data sets, so the 32.3 figure was 
taken.
1998, 2006 
for median 
income. 
1992, 2008 
for GINI.
 Gini coefficient 
 
The Gini coefficients, when data was available in the Luxembourg Income Study 
database, were calculated according to the method provided by the Luxembourg Income 
Study (2016: 27). The Gini coefficient for “per capita income” was used, in order to be 
consistent with the way the data from PovcalNet is presented. The Gini scores that were 
calculated by the distribution income provided by PovcalNet were calculated according 
to the method developed by Datt (1998) by using the “povcal software” calculator listed 
in Datt’s paper to perform the calculations, taking the Beta Lorenz curve estimates. All 
Ginis were double checked against all sources with data available for the given years in 
the “All the Ginis” database. The “All the Ginis” dataset lists all Ginis available from any 
of eight original sources for all countries for all years from 1950 to 2012. The problem is 
one of direct comparability between the sources, with no single source providing 
estimates for the desired years for most countries. The direct calculations from the 
Luxembourg Income Study and PovcalNet were therefore more desirable for the 
majority of the countries (see above table). The method of double checking the LIS and 
PovcalNet calculated Ginis against the “All the Ginis” dataset was to compare the 
calculated value with all values given within 3 years of the benchmark year from any 
source reporting in the “All the Ginis” dataset. The direct calculations used from the LIS 
and PovcalNet data were  in all cases within a 20 percent variation range of the majority 
of available estimates within three years of the benchmark year in the “All the Ginis” 
database, with the exception of Russia and Romania for 1995, although both of the latter 
corresponded to the PovcalNet estimate reported in the “All the Ginis” database and 
thus were kept. 
 
For the eight cases where LIS or PovcalNet data were not available for a GINI calculation 
for either one year or both (see above table 10), the most consistent number appearing 
closest to the benchmark years from the “All the Ginis” was taken or, in the cases of New 
Zealand and Portugal, where there was no consistent figure, the UNU Wider WIID 3.3 
database estimate was taken which corresponded to the median income figure and was 
thus internally consistent. As can be seen in the above table 10, Iceland needed to be 
estimated for 1995 to calculate the rate of change, since none of the above options 
provided a reliable figure. 
 
Labor’s share of income 
The four missing data countries, for both the rate of change and the 2008 values, are 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. The above table 10 lists the source for all 
countries, in addition to mentioning if a surrounding year was used rather than the 
benchmark year in cases of incomplete data, and the three cases where the 1995 value 
from OECDStat was an estimation on their behalf (all in the labor’s share source 
column). The countries where data could have been taken from either data set are as 
follows: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Turkey. 
While Trapp’s data was taken in all eight of these cases due to the greater attention paid 
to treating self-employment income in such countries, there was only 1 case out of these 
8 where the 1995 values from the different data sets differed by more than 20 percent, 
and only 2 cases out of 8 where this was the case for the 2008 values. 
 
Other than these issues, there was no need for any additional treatment of the data. 
 2. Principal component analysis 
 
In this second part of the annex we present some statistical outputs of the principal 
component analysis that have been excluded from the paper and can interest some 
readers that would like to enter further into the details. When pertinent to the appraisal 
of the methodological choices explained in the paper, information regarding the axis that 
has not been retained (axis F4) has been included. 
 
Table 11: Eigenvalues, variability and cumulative variability for axes F1 to F4 
  F1 F2 F3 F4 
Eigenvalue 1,225 1,097 1,004 0,674 
Variability (%) 30,626 27,427 25,088 16,859 
Cumulative % 30,626 58,053 83,141 100,000 
 
Table 12: Eigenvectors for each variable for axes F1 to F4 
  F1 F2 F3 F4 
PART_INDEX 0,689 0,347 0,203 -0,603 
VALCAPT_INDEX 0,023 0,867 -0,150 0,474 
INVESTMENT_INDEX 0,705 -0,349 0,037 0,616 
SOCIAL_INDEX -0,168 0,075 0,967 0,177 
 
Table 13: Squared cosines of the variables for axes F1 to F4 
  F1 F2 F3 F4 
PART_INDEX 0,581 0,132 0,041 0,246 
VALCAPT_INDEX 0,001 0,825 0,023 0,152 
INVESTMENT_INDEX 0,609 0,134 0,001 0,256 
SOCIAL_INDEX 0,035 0,006 0,938 0,021 
Values in bold correspond for each variable to the factor for which the squared cosine is the 
largest 
 
 
 
 
Table 14: Factor scores of each observation for axes F1 to F3 
 
Observation F1 F2 F3 
ARG -0,033 -0,562 -0,428 
AUS -1,148 -2,651 0,300 
AUT -0,416 1,263 0,818 
BEL -0,096 0,020 0,873 
BRA -0,867 0,046 0,006 
CAN -1,045 -0,584 0,355 
CHE -0,046 1,914 1,046 
CHL -0,541 -1,800 -0,306 
CHN 2,477 0,573 -0,763 
 COL -1,084 -0,096 -1,844 
CRI 1,245 0,770 -0,661 
CZE 1,342 -0,278 0,025 
DEU -0,437 1,942 0,203 
DNK -0,340 -0,129 0,992 
ESP -0,036 -0,534 0,838 
EST 0,603 0,279 -0,093 
FIN 0,086 0,255 0,457 
FRA -0,704 0,367 -0,066 
GBR -2,051 1,132 0,360 
GRC -0,901 -1,134 0,179 
HRV 1,565 -0,790 -0,871 
HUN 0,752 -0,090 0,305 
IDN -0,082 -1,583 -0,388 
IND 1,782 -0,302 -1,551 
IRL 0,707 0,687 2,251 
ISL -0,247 -1,036 2,856 
ISR -1,295 1,526 -0,925 
ITA -1,009 0,531 -0,183 
JPN -0,061 2,160 -1,243 
KHM -0,150 2,064 0,317 
KOR 1,325 -0,189 0,395 
LUX 1,648 0,404 1,069 
MEX -0,056 -0,628 -1,726 
MYS 1,853 -0,324 -0,131 
NLD -1,539 1,512 0,810 
NOR -1,189 -1,617 0,505 
NZL -1,506 -0,958 0,801 
PHL -1,114 1,257 -1,490 
POL 0,797 0,070 -0,964 
PRT -0,940 -0,254 0,271 
ROU 0,716 -1,588 -0,374 
RUS -1,233 -1,932 0,088 
SVK 1,415 -0,107 0,534 
SVN 1,161 0,211 0,385 
SWE -0,292 0,768 0,723 
THA 1,605 -0,210 0,334 
TUN 0,176 0,270 -0,951 
TUR -1,047 -0,138 -1,571 
USA -1,741 0,193 -0,102 
VNM 1,891 -0,209 1,234 
ZAF 0,101 -0,491 -2,697 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 15: Contributions of the observations to axes F1 to F3 (in percentage points) 
  F1 F2 F3 
ARG 0,002 0,565 0,358 
AUS 2,111 12,560 0,176 
AUT 0,277 2,853 1,307 
BEL 0,015 0,001 1,489 
BRA 1,202 0,004 0,000 
CAN 1,747 0,609 0,246 
CHE 0,003 6,550 2,137 
CHL 0,468 5,792 0,183 
CHN 9,817 0,587 1,137 
COL 1,881 0,016 6,643 
CRI 2,482 1,060 0,853 
CZE 2,882 0,138 0,001 
DEU 0,306 6,744 0,081 
DNK 0,185 0,030 1,922 
ESP 0,002 0,509 1,371 
EST 0,581 0,139 0,017 
FIN 0,012 0,116 0,409 
FRA 0,793 0,241 0,008 
GBR 6,732 2,291 0,253 
GRC 1,300 2,300 0,063 
HRV 3,918 1,115 1,483 
HUN 0,906 0,014 0,182 
IDN 0,011 4,479 0,294 
IND 5,083 0,162 4,701 
IRL 0,800 0,844 9,899 
ISL 0,098 1,919 15,939 
ISR 2,683 4,162 1,673 
ITA 1,630 0,503 0,066 
JPN 0,006 8,340 3,020 
KHM 0,036 7,611 0,196 
KOR 2,810 0,064 0,305 
LUX 4,347 0,291 2,232 
MEX 0,005 0,706 5,821 
MYS 5,497 0,188 0,034 
NLD 3,790 4,084 1,281 
NOR 2,262 4,674 0,499 
NZL 3,630 1,640 1,252 
PHL 1,985 2,822 4,339 
POL 1,017 0,009 1,814 
PRT 1,415 0,116 0,143 
ROU 0,821 4,504 0,273 
RUS 2,435 6,674 0,015 
SVK 3,205 0,021 0,558 
 SVN 2,157 0,080 0,289 
SWE 0,136 1,054 1,022 
THA 4,123 0,079 0,217 
TUN 0,050 0,130 1,766 
TUR 1,754 0,034 4,825 
USA 4,852 0,066 0,020 
VNM 5,722 0,078 2,973 
ZAF 0,016 0,432 14,214 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: Squared cosines of the observations for axes F1 to F4 
 
  F1 F2 F3 F4 
ARG 0,001 0,146 0,085 0,768 
AUS 0,153 0,816 0,010 0,021 
AUT 0,068 0,627 0,263 0,042 
BEL 0,012 0,001 0,986 0,002 
BRA 0,830 0,002 0,000 0,168 
CAN 0,622 0,194 0,072 0,112 
CHE 0,000 0,728 0,217 0,055 
CHL 0,070 0,780 0,022 0,127 
CHN 0,563 0,030 0,053 0,354 
COL 0,255 0,002 0,737 0,006 
CRI 0,525 0,201 0,148 0,127 
CZE 0,906 0,039 0,000 0,055 
DEU 0,045 0,893 0,010 0,052 
DNK 0,094 0,014 0,796 0,096 
ESP 0,001 0,147 0,363 0,488 
EST 0,497 0,107 0,012 0,385 
FIN 0,015 0,130 0,420 0,435 
FRA 0,581 0,158 0,005 0,256 
GBR 0,748 0,228 0,023 0,001 
GRC 0,370 0,586 0,015 0,029 
HRV 0,355 0,091 0,110 0,444 
HUN 0,175 0,002 0,029 0,794 
IDN 0,002 0,696 0,042 0,261 
IND 0,551 0,016 0,418 0,015 
IRL 0,079 0,075 0,801 0,045 
ISL 0,006 0,112 0,850 0,032 
ISR 0,345 0,479 0,176 0,000 
ITA 0,762 0,211 0,025 0,002 
JPN 0,001 0,749 0,248 0,003 
KHM 0,005 0,964 0,023 0,008 
 KOR 0,729 0,015 0,065 0,191 
LUX 0,196 0,012 0,082 0,710 
MEX 0,001 0,112 0,844 0,044 
MYS 0,795 0,024 0,004 0,176 
NLD 0,358 0,346 0,099 0,197 
NOR 0,328 0,607 0,059 0,006 
NZL 0,591 0,239 0,167 0,003 
PHL 0,238 0,303 0,426 0,033 
POL 0,283 0,002 0,413 0,302 
PRT 0,831 0,061 0,069 0,040 
ROU 0,151 0,740 0,041 0,068 
RUS 0,267 0,655 0,001 0,077 
SVK 0,541 0,003 0,077 0,379 
SVN 0,677 0,022 0,074 0,226 
SWE 0,066 0,456 0,405 0,073 
THA 0,942 0,016 0,041 0,001 
TUN 0,029 0,067 0,832 0,073 
TUR 0,285 0,005 0,642 0,068 
USA 0,979 0,012 0,003 0,005 
VNM 0,661 0,008 0,281 0,049 
ZAF 0,001 0,029 0,867 0,103 
Values in bold correspond for each observation to the factor for which the squared cosine is the 
largest 
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